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Abstract
Employment contracts are often incomplete, leaving many respon-
sibilities subject to workers’ discretion. High work morale is therefore
essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in
firms. We conducted a field experiment to test whether workers recip-
rocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity. Wage
cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity, reducing
average output by more than 20 percent. An equivalent wage increase,
however, did not result in any productivity gains. The results from an
additional control experiment with high monetary performance incen-
tives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more
output, leaving enough room for positive reactions. Altogether, these
results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity, as op-
posed to inequality aversion.
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“Dissatisfaction of the workers with their treatment by the man-
agement is to be counted among the most important causes of
low morale, for it is common knowledge that men tend to hold
back and to do little as possible for those against whom they feel
a grievance.”
Sumner H. Slichter (1920, p.40)
1 Introduction
Do wage cuts damage work morale? In the presence of incomplete contracts,
work morale crucially determines the success of employment relationships.
Work morale reflects the degree to which workers voluntarily cooperate and
contribute to the employer’s goals. Scholars have argued that work morale is
sensitive to the relationship between the workers’ actual wage and a reference
wage (e.g. see Bewley (1999)). Positive and negative deviations from the ref-
erence wage are interpreted as kind or unkind; employees then reciprocate
by exerting higher or lower effort, respectively. While this theoretical argu-
ment has a long tradition in economics (e.g. see Akerlof (1982) or Slichter
(1920)), corresponding field evidence is scarce – in particular with respect to
the impact of wage cuts.
This paper sheds light on the interplay between wages and work morale
in employment relations. We conducted a controlled field experiment and
tested the extent to which workers react to wage cuts and corresponding pay
raises. A university library hired workers to catalogue books for a limited
time period (i.e. excluding any possibility of reemployment) and announced
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a projected wage of e15 per hour. We actually paid this amount in our
baseline treatment, and it serves as an exogenous reference point for wage
expectations. In our main treatment, we inform subjects immediately before
work begins that we will only pay them e10 per hour. In a second treatment,
we do the opposite and communicate a pay raise from e15 to e20 per hour
in order to explore asymmetries between the impact of wage cuts and pay
raises.
The results show that wage cuts have a severe impact on workers’ pro-
ductivity. On average output decreased by more than 20% when workers
experienced a wage cut. Moreover, this negative effect was visible across
the entire performance distribution and remained remarkably persistent over
time, suggesting that negative reciprocal behavior plays an important role
in the field. In contrast, we found no significant evidence for positive reci-
procity in response to an equivalent pay raise. Average productivity was
almost identical in the baseline and pay raise treatments, highlighting an
asymmetric reaction of work morale to positive and negative deviations from
the reference wage.
We show in a subsequent control experiment that the lack of positive
reactions is unlikely due to a ceiling effect – i.e. workers were not constrained
by their physical limit in the baseline and pay raise treatments. For this
purpose we hired more subjects for doing the same task, but incentivized
their performance. Workers received a piece rate which increased stepwise up
to e0.40 per book with the achievement of specific output targets. Average
output was almost 25% higher than in the baseline treatment and the entire
performance distribution was shifted towards higher outputs. This suggests
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that there was enough room for productivity to increase by a substantial
amount and that our results are unlikely to be confounded by a ceiling effect.
Strikingly, we observe that in contrast to the quantity of output the wage
cut did not hurt quality. In light of these results one could speculate that
the wage cut is reciprocated by low work energy, which translates into low
output quantity, rather than surreptitious sabotage of output quality.1
Our results underline that workers are not purely self-interested, because
otherwise we should not observe any performance differences between treat-
ments. Below we apply two prominent social-preference models of inequality
aversion and reciprocity, respectively, and discuss under which assumptions
those models are reconcilable with our results.2 We argue that action-based
reciprocity models are better suited to explain our data than purely outcome-
oriented models of inequity aversion. The reason is that due to other sources
of income the firm’s payoff is typically larger than that of the worker, no
matter what effort level he or she chooses. Thus, the firm is always “ahead”
of the worker, and considerations based on relative positions cannot explain
the observed differences in workers’ behavior. By contrast, in action-based
reciprocity models (such as, e.g., Cox et al. (2007)) individuals directly react
to kind or unkind actions independently of their relative positions. Therefore,
these models explain our results in a more straightforward manner.
Our field experiment makes several contributions to the existing litera-
ture. First, a substantial amount of laboratory evidence demonstrates a pos-
itive relationship between wages and effort (e.g. see Fehr et al. (1993), Abeler
1We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
2According to the taxonomy proposed by Card et al. (forthcoming) our study falls into
the category of Competing Models field experiments.
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et al. (2010), or Charness (2004)). However, the extent to which these results
can be generalized to naturally occurring markets is not clear (see DellaVigna
(2009), Falk and Heckmann (2009) or Levitt and List (2007)). Laboratory
experiments are generally characterized by a high level of experimenter ob-
trusiveness, which could create demand effects. Moreover, lab experiments
generally do not involve the exertion of actual effort but simply consist of
monetary transfers. For these reasons, Gneezy and List (2006) conducted the
first field experiment testing for positive reciprocity in the workplace. Mim-
icking the one-shot interactions in the lab they created short-term employ-
ment opportunities for data-entry and door-to-door fundraising. In addition
to the fact that their workers were assigned a real effort task, subjects did not
know that they were part of an experiment. In contrast to the evidence from
the lab, Gneezy and List (2006) found that an increase in hourly wages had
only a transient effect, which ultimately did not pay off for the employer.3
Our field experiment builds on the basic design of Gneezy and List (2006),
but allows for a novel view on the impact of wage cuts.4 In addition, the
influence of wage cuts and pay raises on work morale can be studied within
the same framework - highlighting significant asymmetries in the field.
Second, our findings are related to a series of interview studies on work
morale (see Bewley (2005) for a review). For example, Bewley (1999) asked
3Other field experiments typically found only weak or moderate evidence for positive
reciprocity (Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010), Cohn et al. (2009), Bellemare and Shearer (2009)
or Al-Ubaydli et al. (2011)); an exception are those studies analyzing non-monetary gifts
(Maréchal and Thöni (2010), Kube et al. (forthcoming) and Falk (2007)).
4In an older experiment reported by Pritchard et al. (1972), subjects were only made
to believe that they were accidentally over- or underpaid; their actual wages remained
unchanged. The results show no significant treatment effects, but their experimental
manipulation is arguably much weaker. More recently, Cohn et al. (2011) conducted a
field experiment showing that social comparison amplifies the impact of wage cuts.
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compensation executives for the reasons why firms are reluctant to cut wages
or avoid hiring underbidders during economic downturns. The general insight
from these interview studies is that the desire to maintain good work morale
seems to be a key rationale employers provide for their policies. This valuable
first indication on the role of work morale in labor markets is complemented
by the causal evidence from our field experiments.
Third, identifying the causal impact of wage changes on work morale
poses serious difficulties in the field. Changes in compensation generally
reflect firms’ choices and are therefore potentially endogenous due to unob-
servable confounds (see Shearer (2003)). Moreover, employment contracts
are frequently embedded in ongoing relationships between workers and em-
ployers. This implies that also pecuniary reasons might exist for workers’
reaction to wage changes. In particular, i) workers might provide less effort
after a wage cut because they play a trigger strategy and punish the firm
for cutting their wages (see Howitt (2002)); or ii) lower wages might dampen
the disciplining effect of getting fired because they reduce future rents (see
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989)). On the other
hand, other effects could potentially mitigate the negative impact on work
morale. Specifically, self-selection of workers might lead to a replacement of
quitting workers by new ones who are willing to work at the lower wages.
The experimental approach in our study controls for these issues and makes
it possible to separate work morale from reputational and other confounding
motives. In the experiment, wage changes were exogenous and reputation ef-
fects were minimized by design. We took great care in making clear that we
offer a one time job without any possibility of reemployment. Consequently,
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our results nicely complement the few field studies that looked at workers’
reactions to wage cuts using non-experimental data (see Greenberg (1990),
Mas (2006), and Lee and Rupp (2007)).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We describe the
experimental design in Section 2 and present the results in Section 3. Section
4 concludes the paper with a theoretical discussion of the results.
2 Experimental Design
In August 2006, the library of an economic chair at a German university
had to be catalogued. We took this opportunity to run a field experiment
and recruited workers with posters. The announcement said that it was a
one-time job opportunity for one day (six hours), and that pay was projected
to be e15 per hour.5 The projected wage of e15 served as an exogenously
set reference wage for the workers. About 200 persons applied during the
two month announcement phase. A research assistant randomly picked 30
persons from the list of applicants. They were invited via email and asked
to confirm the starting date, reminding them that the job was projected to
pay e15 per hour. Upon arrival, the subjects were seated in separate rooms
in front of a computer terminal (with internet browser) and a table with a
random selection of books. Their task was to enter the book’s author(s), title,
publisher, year of publication, and ISBN number into an electronic data base.
The computer application (see Figure 1) in which they entered the details of
5The announcement said “The hourly wage is projected to be e15,” (the exact German
wording was “Ihr Stundenlohn beträgt voraussichtlich e15”), in order to leave room for
later wage changes without cheating.
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the books recorded the exact time of each log, allowing us to reconstruct the
number of books each person entered over time without having to monitor
work performance explicitly. This data entry task is well suited for our
experiment and is commonly used in field experiments6 because it allows for
a precise measurement of output and quality. Moreover, the task is relatively
simple and can be done in isolation, allowing for more control than usually
available in other field settings. Participants were allowed to take a break
whenever necessary. A research assistant explained them the task by strictly
following a fixed protocol. Right before workers started their task, they were
told their actual hourly wage – which depended on the treatment assignment.
Figure 1: Screenshot: Computer Application
We conducted three different treatments. The hourly wage paid was
e15 in the “Baseline” treatment, e20 in “PayRaise” and e10 in “PayCut”.7
6See Gneezy and List (2006), Kube et al. (forthcoming), Kosfeld and Neckermann
(2011) and Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010) for recent examples.
7e10 still exceed the hourly wages usually paid to a student helper at German uni-
versities, which is about e8. We paid slightly higher wages in order to avoid selection
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Because the experiment was set up as a one-shot situation, our manipulation
represents a cut with respect to an exogenous wage expectation – and not
with respect to the past wage which serves as a reference point in ongoing
employment relations. We thus capture what is arguably a key aspect of
wage cuts, namely the induced disappointment and the break of a trust
relation between workers and the firm (see Bewley (2005)). In order to keep
communication constant across treatments we opted for a neutral framing of
wage changes and gave workers no reason why they were paid more or less
than the projected e15.8 In our first wave of experiments, we had 10 workers
each in the benchmark and in the wage cut treatments, and 9 workers in the
pay raise treatment, because one worker did not show up for work.
We invited three workers per day – one in each treatment. The assign-
ment of workers to the treatment groups was randomized. In order to avoid
any treatment contaminations through social interaction, workers showed up
sequentially at different times and were separated from each other, in dif-
ferent rooms. We did not tell them that we had employed other workers.
Furthermore, all workers interacted with the same research assistant, cir-
cumventing any confounding experimenter effects.9 After 6 hours of work,
all workers completed a brief questionnaire. In order to observe their behav-
ior in a natural environment, workers were not told that they were taking
part in an experiment.
problems arising from workers quitting due to higher outside options. None of the invited
workers refused to work for e10.
8None of the workers actually asked for an explanation. The exact wording was, “We
pay you an hourly wage of e20 (e10). Your hourly wage is thus e20 (e10) instead of
e15”.
9The research assistant neither knew the purpose of the study nor the reason for the
differing wages.
8
In October 2008, we increased our sample size and ran a second wave
of identical treatments. None of the workers from the second wave had
participated in the first wave. For our main treatments, we have data from
68 workers in total: 25 in Baseline, 21 in PayCut and 22 in PayRaise.
In April 2011, we conducted an additional control experiment "Piece-
Rate" with 18 new subjects. This provides a benchmark for assessing workers’
physical limits on the data-entry task.10 Their task was the same: catalogu-
ing books for six hours. Instead of a flat wage of 15 Euro per hour, they faced
a strong performance incentive. Every worker i received a base salary of e10
and a piece rate which increased with the total number of books Yi entered.
The total payment i for a subject was given by the following formula:
i(Yi) = e10+
8>>>><>>>>:
e0.15  Yi; if Yi < 240
e0.30  Yi if 240  Yi < 260
e0.40  Yi if 260  Yi:
(1)
3 Results
Panel (a) in Figure 2 illustrates average worker productivity (measured by
the number of book entries) per 90 minute time interval, or quarter, for each
of the three different treatments. Table 1 contains the average treatment
effects – i.e. the difference in average number of books logged – and the
p-values from the corresponding nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for
10We refrained from re-running our main treatments as controls because the results
from this control experiment are only used to demonstrate that workers can potentially
go beyond the performance observed in the above main treatments. We thus implicitly
assume that the distribution of workers’ skill levels remained stable over time.
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the null hypothesis of equal output between treatments.
Figure 2: Productivity as a Function of Wages
40
45
50
55
60
Av
er
ag
e 
# 
of
 b
oo
k 
en
tri
es
 p
er
 q
ua
rte
r
I II III IV
Quarter
PayRaise
Baseline
PayCut
(a) Productivity Development Over Time
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
100 150 200 250 300 350
Total number of book entries
PayRaise
Baseline
PayCut
(b) Cumulative Distribution Functions
Notes: Panel (a) depicts the average number of books entered per quarter (90 minutes)
for the three treatments PayRaise, PayCut, and Baseline. The corresponding cumulative
distribution functions for total work performance are illustrated in Panel (b).
The results show a substantial difference in productivity between the
Baseline and PayCut treatment. This effect is highly significant from a sta-
tistical and economical point of view (see columns 3 and 4 in Table 1). On
average, output was 21% (or 47 books) lower in treatment PayCut than in
Baseline. Moreover, as can be inferred from Figure 2, the productivity gap
is stable over time. It remains large and significant for all four quarters.
On the other hand, the average treatment effect for the pay raise is slightly
negative (although insignificant: p = 0:247) during the first quarter. Inter-
estingly, the effect tends to become positive over the course of time, but does
10
Table 1: Average Treatment Effects by Time Intervals: # Book Entries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time interval PayRaise-Baseline p > jzj PayCut-Baseline p > jzj
Quarter I -4.9 (-9.5%) 0.247 -13.3 (-25.6%) 0.001
Quarter II 0.5 (1.0%) 0.757 -12.2 (-22.1%) 0.012
Quarter III 0.1 (0.2%) 0.991 -11.5 (-20.7%) 0.013
Quarter IV 3.7 (6.5%) 0.508 -9.9 (-17.2%) 0.026
All quarters -0.8 (-0.3%) 0.991 -46.7 (-21.3%) 0.005
Observations N=46 N=47
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 report average treatment effects (percentages in parentheses) for
the treatments PayRaise and PayCut in comparison with Baseline by 90 minutes time
intervals, or quarters. The outcome variable is the number of book entries. Columns 2 and
4 report the corresponding p-values from a nonparametric (two-sided) Wilcoxon rank-sum
test for the null hypothesis of equal output between treatments.
not reach statistical significance in any quarter (see column 2 of Table 1).
Overall, we find no evidence for positive reciprocal behavior. Average output
is almost identical in the Baseline and PayRaise treatments, with 219.4 and
218.6 books, respectively.
The cumulative distribution functions in Panel (b) of Figure 2 show that
our results are not driven by one or two individual workers; instead they
reflect a broad behavioral phenomenon. While the distribution functions for
PayRaise and Baseline are closely intertwined, the distribution function for
PayCut is clearly shifted towards lower performance. For example, while the
fraction of workers who entered 200 or fewer books is only around 40% in
the Baseline treatment, it amounts to 80% in the PayCut treatment.
The panel regression results in Table 2 are in line with the preceding
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nonparametric analysis. Our main regression model is specified as follows:
Yit = +1PRi+2PCi+3PRi Qit+4PCi Qit+Qit+ X i+ it; (2)
where Yit represents the number of books entered by worker i in quarter t.
Qit is a vector consisting of dummy variables indicating the corresponding
quarter and PCi and PRi, respectively, indicate whether a worker was in the
PayCut or PayRaise treatment. The dummy for the Baseline is omitted from
the model and serves as the reference category. We explore how treatment
effects evolve over time, and interact both treatment indicators with the
quarter dummy variables. Furthermore, room fixed effects, starting time as
well as socioeconomic background (age, gender and subject of studies) are
included in our set of control variables X i. We estimated our model using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Standard errors are corrected for clustering
on the individual level, accounting for individual dependency of the error
term it over time.
The coefficient estimate for PayCut is highly significant and has the ex-
pected sign in the benchmark model without interaction effects (column 1),
whereas the coefficient for PayRaise is close to zero and does not reach sta-
tistical significance. Moreover, all of the PayCut and Quarter interaction
terms in column (2) are relatively small and insignificant, highlighting tem-
poral stability of the treatment effects during the observed time span. On
the other hand, the estimated PayRaise and Quarter interaction terms indi-
cate that the effect of the pay raise is significantly higher after quarter one.
Positive reciprocal reactions thus tend to strengthen with the elapse of time.
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Table 2: Regression Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
————— total entries ————– correct entries
PayRaise 1.537 -3.243 -1.594
(3.261) (3.186) (3.058)
PayCut -13.967*** -15.577*** -10.172**
(3.767) (3.871) (3.940)
Quarter II 5.132*** 3.080* 1.800
(0.850) (1.569) (1.718)
Quarter III 5.515*** 3.360* 2.320
(0.998) (1.743) (2.000)
Quarter IV 9.221*** 5.440** 5.680**
(1.328) (2.660) (2.268)
PayRaise  Quarter II 5.444*** 7.105***
(1.979) (2.144)
PayRaise  Quarter III 5.021** 6.347**
(2.365) (2.525)
PayRaise  Quarter IV 8.655** 6.225**
(3.339) (2.867)
PayCut  Quarter II 1.147 1.473
(2.048) (2.249)
PayCut  Quarter III 1.867 2.453
(2.421) (2.585)
PayCut  Quarter IV 3.424 1.684
(3.086) (2.669)
Constant 99.508*** 101.505*** 103.073***
(28.714) (29.072) (27.821)
Controls:
Socioeconomic? YES YES YES
Room FE? YES YES YES
Starting time? YES YES YES
Observations 272
# Workers 68
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the individual level are reported in parentheses). The dependent variables are the number
of book entries per quarter, respectively the number of correct book entries in column (3).
The treatment dummies PayCut and PayRaise are interacted with the Quarter dummies II
to IV. The dummy for treatment Baseline is omitted from the regression model and serves
as the reference category. Definitions and summary statistics for the control variables are
reported in the additional Online Appendix. Significance levels are denoted as follows: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
13
A further interesting result – which is also visible in Figure 2 – is that the
number of entries per quarter increases substantially over time, which we
interpret as a learning effect.
Robustness Checks
We performed several robustness checks. First, in addition to the quantity
of output, we also investigated the impact of our treatments on output qual-
ity. We measured output quality by the ratio of faultless entries to the total
number of books entered (see Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010) for a similar ap-
proach).11 The average quality ratio amounts to 84.4% in treatment Baseline.
Interestingly, we find that quality is with 90.4% significantly higher in the
PayCut treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p = 0:030), suggesting that the
lower typing speed resulted in fewer mistakes. Quality measured 87.7% in
PayRaise, and was also slightly higher than in the Baseline treatment. Nev-
ertheless the difference does not reach statistical significance (p = 0:800). In
order to account for both, the quantity and the quality dimension of effort,
we used the number of correct entries as a composite measure of work perfor-
mance. The results are displayed in column (3) of Table 2 and show that the
coefficient estimate for PayCut remains large and statistically significant. We
also experimented with an alternative specification using the total number
of entries as the dependent variable and the number of typing errors as an
additional control variable. The results are robust using this specification.
11Two research assistants searched for incorrectly entered ISBN numbers and spelling
mistakes in the book titles (using an automatic spell check program).
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Second, if the employees already worked at their physical limit in treat-
ment Baseline we would observe that higher wages are ineffective even if
workers wanted to provide more effort. We tested whether workers reached
their physical limit in Baseline with the additional control experiment “Piece-
Rate”. Instead of a fixed hourly wage, workers were paid a piece rate which
increased stepwise up to e0.40 per book with the achievement of specific
output targets (see Equation (1) for the exact formula).
Figure 3: Incentive Effects
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Notes: Panel (a) depicts the average number of books entered per quarter (90 minutes)
for the treatments PieceRate and Baseline. The corresponding cumulative distribution
functions for total work performance are illustrated in Panel (b).
The results in Figure 3 show that workers produced substantially more
output when they were paid by performance rather than a fixed wage. Aver-
age output was with 274 books 24.7% higher in treatment PieceRate than in
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Baseline. This difference is statistically significant according to a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test (p < 0:001). Moreover, Panel (b) in Figure 3 highlights that
the entire performance distribution is shifted towards a higher output. Only
one subject was below the average or median output of treatment Baseline.
In contrast to these output differences, quality of output was largely unaf-
fected by the piece rate. The average quality in the PieceRate treatment
was 83.2% and did not significantly differ from Baseline (Wilcoxon rank-sum
test: p = 0:483). The regression results in column (1) and (2) of Table 3 in
Appendix C show that the results remain unchanged if we control for other
potential influences. In column (3) we use the number of correct entries as
the dependent variable. The results remain qualitatively unchanged if we
take into account both, the quantity and quality dimension of output. Al-
together the results from treatment PieceRate suggest that workers neither
reached their physical limit in Baseline nor in PayRaise.
Finally, as alternatives to using OLS with clustered standard errors, we
conducted all regressions using (i) bootstrapped standard errors or (ii) a
random effects model with Generalized Least Squares. The main results
remained unchanged with respect to these alternative specifications. We
also experimented by adding the hourly wage earned at their most recent
job as a proxy for human capital to our empirical models. We found that
controlling for previous wages does not affect the results.12
12The results from these robustness checks are available upon request.
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4 Discussion
The results show that wage cuts have a severe impact on productivity. More-
over, this negative effect remained large and significant over the course of the
entire working period. While these results are supportive for the idea that
wage cuts damage work morale, we found no significant evidence that an
equivalent pay raise fostered productivity. Assuming that workers are purely
self-interested we should not observe any performance differences between
treatments, because wages were not tied to performance and employment re-
lations were one-shot. As such, our findings can be considered as a reduced-
form step forward in understanding the role of social preferences in labor
markets. The question remains which model of social preferences is able to
explain our results. Two prominent approaches in the literature are models
of inequality aversion and models of reciprocity. Both approaches provide
potential explanations for the behavior observed in laboratory gift-exchange
games. In the following we briefly discuss these models in light of our field
experiment.
Models of inequality aversion assume that people face a trade-off be-
tween maximizing their own income and equalizing income distributions. In
a standard laboratory gift-exchange game with symmetric outside options
the worker’s payoff exceeds the employer’s payoff if the employer paid a high
fixed wage upfront. By exerting costly effort workers increase the employer’s
payoff and therefore reduce payoff inequalities. Hence, if workers are suffi-
ciently inequality averse, higher wage payments lead to higher effort levels
(see Fehr and Schmidt (1999), p.848ff). While these models (see also Bolton
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and Ockenfels (2000)) provide a plausible interpretation of the laboratory
data, it is unclear to what extent they explain our field data.13 In contrast
to the lab, a worker’s payoff is usually well below the firm’s payoff in the
field. The firm (i.e. here the university) typically has substantial income
from other projects. Consequently, the firm does not “fall behind” by paying
a high wage.14 Costly effort reduces the worker’s payoff and widens the pay-
off gap between the firm and the worker. An inequality-averse worker would
thus choose minimal effort irrespective of the actual wages. This hypothesis
is clearly rejected by our data. Our results could still be made consistent with
a model of inequality aversion if we additionally assume that workers neglect
the firms’ other sources of income and focus solely on current bilateral rents
– i.e. workers are "narrow bracketing" (see Read et al. (1999), p.186). Evi-
dently, in that case appropriate additional assumptions about the magnitude
of (the worker’s perception of) these rents are necessary (see Appendix A for
details).
As pointed out by Card et al. (forthcoming), it might be easier to reconcile
gift-exchange in the field with an action-based reciprocity model.15 Consider,
for example the following simple model based on Cox et al. (2007). Let the
utility of a worker be given by u(xw; xf ) = xw + xf .16 The firm’s payoff
xf = v(e)   w equals the value v(e) of the output that is produced by
the worker minus the unconditional wage payment w. The worker’s payoff
xw = w   c(e) equals the wage payment minus effort costs c(e). If the firm
13We thank the Editor for pointing this out.
14See Appendix A for a formalization of this argument using Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
15See also Levine (1998) or Rabin (1993) for type-based and intention-based models of
reciprocity, respectively.
16This corresponds to the utility function in Cox et al. (2007) with  = 1.
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acts unkind the “emotional state function”  has a negative sign. The worker
will then choose minimal effort, because costly effort reduces the worker’s
payoff and increases the firm’s payoff, both of which causes a drop in the
worker’s utility. By contrast, if the firm acts kind  is strictly positive. In
this case, the (-weighted) value of the produced output v(e) enters positively
into the workers utility via the firm’s payoff. Optimal effort e then needs to
satisfy v0(e) = c0(e). For a large class of reasonable cost- and production-
functions, there exists a unique solution that exceeds the minimal effort level
(see Appendix B for details).
The model’s predictions are in line with our field data under the following
assumptions. First, an arbitrary wage cut is considered an unkind action
(  0) and a pay raise a kind action ( > 0). Second,  is assumed to
be positive in treatment Baseline, too. Otherwise workers would choose
minimal effort in Baseline. This assumption seems plausible for our setting,
because we chose a quite generous wage of e15 in Baseline, leaving room
for wage cuts. Our workers earned on average a bit more than e10.50 in
previous employment relations (see Table 1 in the online appendix). Third,
one has to assume that either the increase in  between Baseline and PayRaise
is small, or that marginal costs of effort are increasing in effort. Both of
these conditions seem plausible; the latter corresponds to standard convexity
assumptions on cost functions. Under either assumption, effort would react
less to a pay rise than a pay cut, in line with our data. In contrast to the
inequality-aversion models discussed above, no additional assumption about
narrow bracketing is needed. In this action-based reciprocity model workers
will also engage in gift-exchange with firms that are "ahead" in payoffs -
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as long as the wage payment is not perceived as unkind, i.e., as long as
 > 0 holds. The key feature of the underlying explanation is the asymmetry
of the worker’s optimal effort response function: for all  > 0 there is an
interior solution strictly above the minimal effort level, while for all   0
the optimal response is constant at the minimal level. This can easily lead to
an asymmetric reaction of optimal effort to wage cuts versus wage increases.
While our study provides suggestive evidence that action-based reciprocity
models can explain gift-exchange in the field, a rigorous test of the different
models needs additional information. Specifically, it would require precise
knowledge of workers’ effort costs and workers’ perceptions of output value.
The latter might simply be induced or elicited. Actual effort costs could be
estimated from data on workers’ output under different piece rates; the piece
rates being randomly generated to minimize the impact of intentions. Addi-
tional treatments with wage changes of different magnitudes would further
help to pin down the curvature of the wage-output-function.
Future studies might also explore the determinants of the emotional state
 in more detail. For example, workers’ evaluation of wage cuts and pay raises
- and consequently their behavioral reaction to them - might depend on the
explanations for the wage changes (e.g., Greenberg (1990) and Chen and
Horton (2009)). Wage cuts might be perceived differently during a recession
if workers understand that the wage cuts are necessary for the company to
stay afloat (or to avoid layoffs).
In ongoing relations, workers might face a trade-off between giving in to
their negative reactions and increasing the risk of being fired because of poor
work performance. Furthermore, self-selection might mitigate the negative
20
effects of wage cuts. Workers who are dissatisfied with a wage cut could quit
the job and might be replaced by other workers who are willing to work for
those wages. These issues promise to be interesting topics for future research.
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Appendix A: Application of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999)
In this appendix, we explore the possibility to explain our data with the
concept of inequality aversion. In the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
for instance, the utility function of the worker is given by uw(xw; xf ) =
xw     maxf0;xf   xwg     maxf0;xw   xfg, where xw is the worker’s
payoff and xf the firm’s payoff. In most specifications of the model one has
0 <  <  (so that uw has a kink at the point where xf = xw) and  < 1.
The worker’s payoff xw is composed of the unconditional wage payment w
minus cost of effort c(e) plus income from other resources m. The effort level
e is assumed to be non-negative and above some minimal acceptable level
emin. The firm’s payoff xf is given by the value v(e) of the output produced
by the worker minus the wage payment w plus income from other resources
M . The difference xf   xw is given by M   m   2w + v(e) + c(e). Under
usual circumstances, the firm’s incomeM will be much larger than the single
worker’s income m also after correcting for the term 2w so that the payoff
difference xf   xw is generally positive. In that case, the worker’s utility
function reduces to
uw(xw; xf ) = xw     [xf   xw] :
Assuming that v() and c() are strictly increasing in effort, this implies that
the worker will always choose the minimal admissible effort level, indepen-
dently of the specific wage payment. But this is rejected by our data.
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Some laboratory experiments suggest that subjects are “narrow bracke-
ting” , i.e. they neglect income and rents from other sources (e.g. see Read
et al. (1999)). While this assumption seems less plausible in the field it can
yield a possible explanation of our data under additional assumptions. If the
worker neglects income from other sources (M and m), the optimal effort
choice will depend on the sign of xf   xw. First, if [xf (emin)   xw(emin)] =
v(emin) + c(emin)  2w > 0, then the worker will always choose the minimal
admissible effort level emin since the difference xf   xw is increasing in e (as
already argued above). If on the other hand, the difference xf xw is negative
for all admissible levels of effort and all relevant wage payments, then the
worker’s utility reduces to
uw(xw; xf ) = xw     [xw   xf ] :
This implies that the optimal effort level e is either given by the first-order
condition

1    v
0(e) = c0(e);
or by the corner solution emin, depending on the specification of the func-
tions c() and v(). In any case, optimal effort would be independent of the
wage payment which is inconsistent with our data. Thus, to explain our data
one would have to assume that, at least for some of the actual wages of our
treatments, the “equalizing” effort ~e, i.e. the effort ~e for which xf = xw, is
admissible. Indeed, as is easily verified, ~e is the only other candidate for an
interior solution. Note that of the three candidate solutions to the optimal
effort response problem in fact only ~e depends on the wage payment (be-
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cause satisfaction of the condition xf = xw depends on the wage payment).
Whether ~e is the actual solution depends on further specifications of the
functions c() and v().
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Appendix B: Application of Cox et al. (2007)
The following simple model is based on Cox et al. (2007). The utility function
of the worker is given by uw(xw; xf ) = xw + xf , where xw is the worker’s
payoff, xf the firms payoff, and  is an “emotional state function.” The
functional form corresponds to Cox et al. (2007) model with  = 1. The
worker’s payoff xw is composed of the unconditional wage payment w plus
rents m from other sources minus cost of effort c(e); the cost function c() is
assumed to be increasing and convex. The firm’s payoff xf is given by the
value v(e) of the output produced by the worker plus rents M from other
projects minus the wage payment w; the production function v() is assumed
to be increasing and concave. The exact size and the sign of the “emotional
state function” depends on reciprocity. In line with Cox et al. (2007),  is
assumed to be positive, except when the firm acts unkindly in which case 
becomes negative. For our purposes it is natural to assume that  is positive
also in the “neutral” benchmark case when the worker is paid the announced
wage. This is justified by the fact that the the wage of e15 in our benchmark
treatment is already quite generous.17
The worker’s optimal effort choice is given by the solution to
max
eemin
(m+ w   c(e) +   v(e)    w +  M);
where emin is the minimal effort level, as above. If  < 0, the solution to this
problem is e = emin since the objective function is decreasing. On the other
17Our workers earned on average a bit more than e10.50 in previous employment rela-
tions.
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hand, if  > 0 and   v0(emin) > c0(emin) then the solution e is strictly above
emin. If in addition, c0() is unbounded as e gets large, then the solution e
is given by the first order condition18:
  v0(e) = c0(e):
Thus, if  > 0 then optimal effort e will (in general) be above the minimal
level. Moreover, e varies continuously with the state function . In par-
ticular, depending on the specific shape of v() and c(), optimal effort may
be quite insensitive to variations of  as long as the latter remains positive.
Thus, optimal effort can also be insensitive to an increase in the wage pay-
ment w. This occurs either if  itself is relatively insensitive to an increase
of w, or if c is sufficiently convex so that a rise of  induces only a small in-
crease in effort because effort is too costly. By contrast, if  changes its sign
and becomes negative, optimal effort suddenly drops to the minimal level.
Given appropriate specifications of v(), c() and , the present model can
thus naturally explain the observed strong negative reaction to wage cuts as
opposed to the mild (or absent) positive reaction to wage increases. Note in
particular, that the optimal effort response naturally depends on the magni-
tude of the wage payment, but not on income from unrelated sources. Unlike
inequality aversion models, an action-based reciprocity model does not need
any assumption about “narrow-bracketing”.
The assumption that  becomes negative after a wage cut, induces an
asymmetry in workers behavior because optimal effort is always at the mini-
18The second-order condition is satisfied due to convexity of c() and concavity of v().
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mal acceptable level in case of a wage cut. While our data are consistent with
this asymmetry, other assumptions on  would make similar predictions. For
instance, one could assume that  is a positive function of wages and is kinked
at a “neutral” reference wage. But even without such a kink, an asymmetry
could occur due to increasing marginal costs of effort. In general, one would
then obtain interior solutions both for the wage increase and the wage cut.
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Appendix C: Additional Regressions
Table 3: Regression Analysis: PieceRate versus Baseline
(1) (2) (3)
————— total entries ————– correct entries
PieceRate 16.170*** 10.862* 11.730**
(5.556) (5.822) (5.810)
Quarter II 5.163*** 3.080* 1.800
(1.142) (1.600) (1.752)
Quarter III 7.000*** 3.360* 2.320
(1.569) (1.778) (2.039)
Quarter IV 8.605*** 5.440* 5.680**
(2.342) (2.713) (2.313)
PieceRate  Quarter II 4.976** 6.033**
(2.074) (2.348)
PieceRate  Quarter III 8.696*** 8.569***
(2.930) (2.861)
PieceRate  Quarter IV 7.560 6.598
(4.792) (4.193)
Constant 169.078** 171.300** 219.352***
(69.545) (70.159) (62.674)
Controls:
Socioeconomic? YES YES YES
Room FE? YES YES YES
Starting time? YES YES YES
Observations 172
# Workers 43
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors adjusted for clustering at
the individual level are reported in parentheses). The dependent variables are the number of
book entries per quarter, respectively the number of correct book entries in column (3). The
treatment dummy PieceRate is interacted with the quarter dummies II to IV. The dummy for
treatment Baseline is omitted from the regression model and serves as the reference category.
Definitions and summary statistics for the control variables are reported in the additional
Online Appendix. Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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